In our country the judiciary is subordinate to the legislature, not always the case in other domains. This fundamental aspect of our democracy is under threat, as Michael Howard has pointed out, when he spoke in the debate on the Queen’s Speech on curbing the power of judges. His speech, I believe, has gone unreported. So here’s a synopsis.
I did not then foresee the extent to which a challenge to the powers of Parliament would emanate from the judges.
Over the past quarter of a century we have seen a steady shift in power from Parliament and Government to the courts. To begin with, we saw an expansion of the traditional power of the courts to review the exercise of power by the Executive. Traditionally, this power was exercised with restraint. That restraint has more recently become conspicuous by its absence. As the former Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, … described as the “constitutional imperative of judicial self-restraint,” and he gave three reasons for it.
First, he referred to the constitutional imperative, whereby Parliament gives powers to various authorities, including Ministers, for good reasons and in reliance on the level of knowledge and experience that such authorities possess.
Secondly, he referred to the lack of judicial expertise which, he said, made the courts ill-equipped to take decisions in place of the designated authority.
Thirdly, and most pertinently, he referred to what he called the democratic imperative, whereby elected public authorities derive their authority in part from their electoral mandate. He said:
“The electoral system…operates as an important safeguard against the unreasonable exercise of public powers, since elected authorities have to submit themselves, and their decision-making records, to the verdict of the electorate at regular intervals.”
That, surely, is the nub of it. Governments and Members of Parliament are answerable to their electorate, they can be dismissed and they are directly accountable. Judges are unelected, unaccountable and cannot be dismissed.
The difficulties have been exacerbated by the Human Rights Act 1998. The point about these rights is that none of them can be exercised in isolation. Any decision to uphold one right may well infringe someone else’s right, or it may conflict with the rights of the community at large. What has to be done, therefore, is to carry out a balancing exercise in respect of these competing rights.
Who will be ultimately responsible for striking that balance: elected Members of Parliament or unelected judges? Such a balancing exercise is better left, in my opinion, to elected Governments.
The matters on which I have touched this afternoon do not often hit the headlines. But they are, in my view, fundamental to the rights and freedoms of the people we represent in this House and to our ability to defend them. I believe that that ability has been seriously weakened, and I hope that the next Government will be able to do something to redress the balance.






